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COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF MODERN 
DESERT: VENGEFUL, DEONTOLOGICAL, AND 
EMPIRICAL 
PAUL H. ROBINSON* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
THE dispute over the role desert should play, if  any, in assessing 
criminal liability and punishment has a long and turbulent history. 
"Deserved punishment" - referred to variously as desert ,  just 
punishment, retributive punishment, or simply "doing justice" 1 - has 
moved to center stage in the UK and is on its way in the US, both in 
academic debate and in real world institutions. 
The English Criminal Justice Act 1 99 1  was intended to set desert as 
the dominant principle in sentencing1 but the failure of the drafters to 
use language making this explicit led to a serious undermining of the 
principle in subsequent interpretation and application of the Act by a 
judiciary who never favored the approach.2 The Criminal Justice Act 
2003 has only continued the muddle by, on the one hand, simply 
including desert as one on a list of five traditional alternative, and 
conflicting, purposes of sentencing in section 142, while on the other 
hand, apparently adopting a proportionality principle in section 
143(1 ), which has now been adopted as the central principle for 
sentencing in the first guidelines of the Sentencing Guideline Council . 3 
In the US, a number of sentencing guidelines have adopted desert 
as their distributive principle,4 and it is increasingly given deference in 
the '"purposes" section of state criminal codes, 5 where it can be the 
guiding principle in the interpretation and application of the code's 
provisions .6  Indeed, the American Law Institute recently revised the 
' '  Colin S.  Di1-er Professor of Law. U niversity of  Pennsylvania Law School .  The author wishes to 
thank And1·ew von Hirsch. of Cambridge University. for his insights and help. Desiree 
Liverseiclgc for her valuable research assistance. and Dean Edward R ubin. ot· Vanderbilt  La II' 
School. for discussions that stimulated much of the work on this article. 
1 A. von Hirsch. Doi11g Jusricc (New York !97 6 )  
A .  Ashworth. ScllfL'Ilcing and Criminal Jusricc. 4'" ed . .  (Cambridge 2005) .  pp.98 - I  0 I :  see. e. g  .. 
Cunningham (!993) 14 Cr. App. R. ( S )  444 at 447. 
Sentencing Guidel ine Counci l .  Ovcrarching Principles: Seriousness (2004). 
� E.g . . 204 Pa. Code § 303. 1 !  (200 5) :  see M. Tonry. · ·u.S.  Sentencing Systems Fragmenting . . . in 
M. Tonry (eel.) Pc11ul R1'_!im11 ill Orercnmded Tintes ( Oxford 200 4 ) .  p p . 2 l -28. Table 1 . 1 .  ; E.g . . Cal. Penal  Code § 1170(a )( I) (West !985)  ( ' "The legislature finds and declares that the 
purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment ."). 
r .  E.g. Model Penal Code § 1 . 02( 2 )  ( Official Draft !962) 
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Model Penal Code (the first since the Code's  promulgation in 1 962) so 
as to set desert as the official dominant principle for sentencing.7 And 
courts have identified desert as the guiding principle in a variety of 
contexts,8 as with the Supreme Court's  enthroning retributivism as the 
"primary justification for the death penalty. "9 
In both countries there remains substantial controversy over the 
reliance upon desert as the distributive principle for liability and 
punishment. A central criticism in the English debate seems to be that 
desert as a distributive principle would fail to avoid avoidable crime. 1 0 
Interestingly, a central criticism in the American debate is something 
of the reverse:  that desert is inappropriate as a distributive principle 
because it is mean-spirited and harsh, and because it has an unhealthy 
preference for prison . 1 1  In both the American and English debates 
there exist a variety of other complaints, including objections that 
desert is based upon only vague notions that at most mark punishment 
extremes to be avoided, objections that people are in hopeless 
disagreement about what desert requires, objections that it is immoral, 
and objections that it is impracticable to implement . 12 
This article argues that many of these objections are valid, at least 
when applied to one or another conception of desert, but that there are 
at least three distinct conceptions of desert to be found in the current 
debates, typically without distinction being made between them. The 
three include what might be called vengeful desert , deontological 
desert, and empirical desert . Each of the offered criticisms of desert is a 
fair objection to one of these conceptions of desert but an unfair 
objection to another. Thus, an accurate assessment of desert as a 
distributive principle requires that these three conceptions of desert be 
distinguished from one another, and that the strengths and weaknesses 
of each conception be judged on its own . 
I I .  COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF DESERT: VENGEFUL, 
DEONTOLOGICAL, AND EMPIRICAL 
Three conceptions of desert are evident in the present debates over the 
propriety of desert as a distributive principle for criminal liability and 
punishment. 
7 American Law Inst i tute. M odel Penal  Code § 1 .02(2 )  ( adopted May 1 6. 2007 )  [hereinafter M PC 
Amendment). 
� See. for example, the US cases Spa:iano v. Florida, 468 U.S .  447, 462 ( 1 984) :  Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U . S .  1 53,  1 83-84 ( 1 976) :  M. Cotton, "Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution 
as a n  Articulated Purpose of  Criminal Punishment" ( 2000) 37 Am. Cri m .  L. Rev. 1313, 1 326-27, 
1 357 .  
' 1  Spa:iw10 v.  Florida, 468 U . S .  a t  46 1 .  
111 See Part II I .F .  below. 
11 See Parts I I I  .A.-C. below. 
12 See Parts I I I . D  . . E. ,  G. and H . . respectively, below. 
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A. Vengeful Desert 
A conception of desert used by many writers, what might be called 
"vengeful desert ,"  is captured in the often-quoted biblical phrase: "eye 
for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burning for 
burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe." 13 I t  urges punishing an 
offender in a way that mirrors the harm or suffering he has caused, 
typically identified as lex talionis: "the principle or law of retaliation 
that a punishment inflicted should correspond in degree and in kind to 
the offense of the wrongdoer."'" In Kant's words: "For the only time a 
criminal cannot complain that a wrong is done to him [by punishment] 
is when he brings his evil deed back upon himself, and what is done to 
him in accordance with penal law is what he has perpetrated on 
others . "'5 
Some writers argue that lex talionis does not require inflicting the 
exact harm on the offender that the offender inflicted on his victim, 
but only requires the imposition of a relevantly similar deprivation. 16  
This variation thus takes a less demanding form, requiring only that 
the punishment be proportionate to the harm caused, 1 7 sometimes 
captured by the suggestion that "the punishment should fit the 
crime. "'s But even in this diluted form, the primary focus of vengeful 
desert remains the extent of the harm of the offence . 19 
Because of this focus on the harm done, the vengeful conception of 
desert is commonly associated with the victim's perspective. 
Retributive justice "consists in seeking equality between offender 
and victim by subjecting the offender to punishment and commu­
nicating to the victim a concern for his or her antecedent suffering. "211 
''[I]n willing the crime, he willed that he himself should suffer in the 
same degree as his victim."21 And the association with the victim's 
suffering, in turn, associates vengeful desert with the feelings of 
revenge and hatred that we commonly see in victims . Thus, punish­
ment under this conception of desert is sometimes seen as essentially 
an institutionalisation of victim revenge; it is "injury inflicted on a 
'' Exodus 2 1 :24 -25 .  
1 4  The Rundum House Diuionurr o{the English Language ( New York 1 966). p .825.  
I '  I .  Kant. The J'v!ewphrsic.\ or Morals (Mary Gregor trans . . Cambridge 1 99 1 ) p . l 69. 
1"  See J .  Waldron. · · Lex Talionis· ·  ( 1 992) 34 Ariz. L .  Rev. 25. 25-27. 
17  J.  Dressler. · ·The Wisdom and Morality of Present-Day Criminal Sentencing . .  (200.5) 38 Akron 
L. Rev. 8.53. 860. For a modern defence of this '·reciprocity principle. · · as it  is sometimes called. 
see L. Cmcker_ · ·The Upper Limit of  Just Punishment"" ( 1 992) 41 Emory L.J. l 059. l 06.5. 
1' See. for example. J .C. Oleson. · ·comment:  The Punitive Coma" (2002) 90 Calif. L. Rev. 829. n. 
59: R . L .  Christopher. "The Prosecutor's Di lemma: Bargains and Punishments" ( 200.3 ) 72 
Fordham L.  Rev. 93, 1 27 .  
1�  See N .  Lacey. Swte Punishml'llt: Political Principles and Conununitl· Values ( London 1 994 ) . p .  I 7 :  
C .  L .  Ten. Crime. Guilt. and Punishment (Oxford 1 987). p . l 52. 
���  G .  P. Fletcher. "The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution" ( 1 999) 3 Buff. Crim. L.  Rev 
5 1 .  .58. 
cl J. Feinberg and H .  Gross (eds. ) .  Philo.1ophr o{Lmr. 2nd ed. (Belmont 1 980). p .54 1 .  
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wrongdoer that satisfies the retributive hatred felt by that wrongdoer's 
victim and that is justified because of that satisfaction . '' 22 
B. Deontological Desert 
The deontological conception of desert focuses not on the harm of the 
offense but on the blameworthiness of the offender, as drawn from the 
arguments and analyses of moral philosophy. 23 " I t  is morally fitting 
that a person who does wrong should suffer in proportion to his 
wrongdoing. That a criminal should be punished fol lows from his 
guilt, and the severity of the appropriate punishment depends on the 
depravity of his act. " 24 
Thus, the criterion for assessing punishment is broader and richer 
than that for vengeful desert : Anything that affects an offender's 
moral blameworthiness is taken into account in judging the punish­
ment he deserves. The extent of the harm caused or the seriousness of 
the evil done will be part of that calculation but so too will be a wide 
variety of other factors, such as the offender's culpable state of mind 
or lack thereof and the existing conditions at the time of the offence, 
including those that might give rise to claims of justification, excuse, or 
mitigation.  A typical expression of this conception might be: "The 
offender deserves a particular punishment not simply for an act which 
causes harm but according to his personal responsibility for 
committing the act . This evaluation necessarily includes a review of 
the broad array of forces operating upon the individual to ascertain 
the extent of the individual's responsibility ."25 
A key aspect of the deontological conception of  desert, which 
distinguishes it from empirical desert, discussed immediately below, is 
that it transcends the particular people and situation at hand and 
embodies a set of principles derived from fundamental values, 
principles of right and good, and thus will produce justice without 
regard to the political , social, or other peculiarities of the situation at 
hand . As Henry Sidgwick famously put it, moral judgments are made 
"from the point of view of the universe . "26 
22 J. Feinberg and J. Coleman ( eds . ) . Philosophl· ofLall'. 6th cd. ( Belmont 2000). p . 793. 
'3 The most prominent English advocates of desert . von Hirsch and Duff, conceive ot' desert in this 
form. as t'ocusing upon an offender's moral blameworthiness, although they offer different 
accounts of why this should be so. von Hirsch does so for instrumental reasons.  avoiding crime. 
and Duff for deontological reasons, doing j ustice. See A. Duff. Punishmenr. Communiwrion and 
Conununin· ( Oxford 200 I); von Hirsch and Ashworth. Proporrimwte Senrencing: Exploring rile 
Principles (Oxford 2005) .  
24 J .  Rawls. ··Two Concepts of Rules" ( 1 95 5 )  64 Philosophical. Review 3,  5 .  Cent ral here are the 
writings of Immanuel Kant. See ·'The Metaphysics ot' Morals'' in  H. Reiss. ed . ,  and H. B. N isbet 
trans .. lmnwnud Kanr: Political Wrirings (Cambridge 1 99 1  ). p . l 56 . 
25 S. Pillsbury.  ··Emotional Justice: I'vloralizing the Passions of Cri1ninal Punishn1ent"· ( 1989 )  74 
Cornell L. Rev. 655.  663.  
2" H. Sidgwick, The Aierhods o/Erhics, 7th ed . . ( London 1 907).  pp.420-2 1 .  
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C. Empirical Desert 
Empirical desert, like deontological desert, focuses on the blame­
worthiness of the offender. But in determining the principles by which 
punishment is to be assessed, it  looks not to philosophical analyses but 
rather to the community's intuitions of justice . The primary source of 
the principles, then, is empirical research into those factors that drive 
people's assessments of blameworthiness.27 The existing studies 
suggest that the variety of factors at work are as rich and varied as 
those at work in determining deonto logical desert. 2 8  The extent of the 
harm or evil plays an important role, but is only one of a wide variety 
of factors, including many related to the offender's situation and 
personal capacities . 
Also like deontological desert, this conception envisions a set of 
liability and punishment rules to be applied identically to all 
defendants; it is not the community's view of deserved punishment 
in a particular case that is relevant here . Further, in collecting data to 
construct the rules, real cases, especially publicly known cases, 
typically are not a useful source . People's views on such cases are 
commonly biased by political or social context or by other factors, 
such as race, that all would agree have no proper role in setting 
principles of justice. 2 9  Instead, the community's intuitions of justice are 
derived from controlled social science studies that determine the 
factors that influence people's assessment of a violator's blame­
worthiness, not by asking people about abstract factors but rather by 
having them "sentence" a variety of carefully constructed variations of 
cases to see what factors influence their punishment judgements. 
I t  is obvious why one might support a deontological desert 
distribution: to do justice. But why would one support an empirical 
desert distribution? Why should we care about the community's 
intuitions of justice? Just because the community 's  intuitions suggest a 
certain punishment is doing justice, it does not make it so, even if  there 
is a strong agreement on those intuitions. 
The reasons offered in support of an empirical desert distribution 
lie not in its moral implications but in its practical consequences.  If the 
criminal law tracks the community's intuitions of justice in assigning 
liability and punishment, it is argued, the law gains access to the power 
and efficiency of stigmatisation, it  avoids the resistance and subversion 
inspired by an unjust system, it gains compliance by prompting people 
to defer to it  as a moral authority in new or grey areas (such as insider 
2 7  See P .  H.  Robinson and J .  M.  Darley, ''Utility of Desert" ( 1 997)  9 1  Nw.  U.L.  Rev.  453. 456-58. 
28 See. for example, P.  H. Robinson and J. M .  Darley, Justice. Liahi!it\' ami Blame ( Boulder 1 99 5 ), 
pp.203-208. 
29 P.  H. Robinson and R .  Kurzban, "Concordance and ConDict in I ntuitions of Justice" (2007) 9 1  
Minn. L .  Rev. 1 829. 
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trading), and it earns the ability to help shape of powerful influence of 
societal norms. 
[T]he criminal law's moral credibility is essential  to effective crime 
control, and is enhanced if  the distribution of criminal liability is 
perceived as "doing justice," that is, if it assigns liability and 
punishment in  ways that the community perceives as consistent 
with the community's principles of appropriate liability and 
punishment. Conversely, the system's moral credibility, and 
therefore its crime control effectiveness, is undermined by a 
distribution of liability that deviates from community perceptions 
of just desert. 30 
Another writer suggests : 
[In criminal law enforcement] all is not positivism and command. 
The criminal law can only truly shape norms if  it commands some 
moral respect. In the absence of a constable on every corner, the 
mere command of a law that moves too far ahead of existing 
notions of justice and morality will not succeed in shaping 
behavior. It is also unlikely to be enforced consistently in a society 
where the mechanisms of enforcement are susceptible to demo­
cratic pressure . 3 1  
Part I I . E . l .  examines in greater detail the justifications offered in  
support of the empirical conception of desert and the distributive 
implications of those justifications. 
D. Vengeful Versus Other Conceptions of Desert 
Vengeful desert differs from deontological and empirical desert 111 
several respects with important implications. 
1. The Role of Punishrnent Amount: Ordinal Ranking of Cases Versus 
Punishmen t Continuum Endpoint  
The most important difference between vengeful desert and the other 
two conceptions of desert is the importance the former gives to the 
absolute amount of punishment to be imposed . For vengeful desert, 
this absolute amount is its central focus: It must be equal in amount, if  
not also in means, to the suffering caused by the offence conduct. But 
for deontological and empirical desert, the absolute amount of  
punishment i s  of limited interest. Their central concern is the relative 
amount of punishment among cases of differing degrees of moral 
blameworthiness. These latter conceptions of justice focus primarily 
-'" Robinson and Darley. "Utility of Desert. 
..  above note '27. at 457-58 .  
-'1 J .  E. Kennedy. "Making the Crime Fit the Punishment .. ('200'2) 51 Emory L.J .  753 .  838--39 
(footnotes omitted). 
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on ensuring that the offender is given that amount of punishment that 
puts him in his proper ordinal rank among all cases of differing 
degrees of blameworthiness.32 
Once a society has committed itself to a particular endpoint for its 
punishment continuum, which all societies must do - be it the death 
penalty, life imprisonment, fifteen years imprisonment, or something 
less - the ordinal rank of any given case necessarily converts to a 
specific amount of punishment: that amount of punishment that sets 
the offender at his appropriate ordinal rank .  But for deontological and 
empirical desert, the amount of punishment has no other significance. 
If the endpoint of the punishment continuum changes, the amount of 
punishment that an offender deserves under these two conceptions of 
justice also changes, to the amount of  punishment necessary to keep it 
in its proper ordinal rank.  
Thus, while the absolute severity of punishment is central to 
vengeful desert - i t  ought to approximate the suffering of the offense -
it is of limited relevance to deontological and empirical desert . Those 
latter conceptions of desert may play some role in a society's setting its 
punishment continuum endpoint but, even in performing this role, 
these conceptions of desert operate differently than they do when 
performing their core function of establishing the proper ordinal rank 
of each case . In setting the punishment continuum endpoint, these 
conceptions typically offer only general guidance as to extremes that 
should be avoided, rather than to give guidance as the specific 
endpoint to pick_:n 
2. The Role of Punishment Method: Punishment lv!ethod Versus 
Amount 
Another characteristic that deontological and empirical desert share, 
which is not shared by vengeful desert, is the significance given to 
punishment method. The latter cares about the method of punishment: 
Ideally , it matches the means by which the victim was made to suffer .  
Failing this , it  should be imposed in a way that is at least relevant to 
the nature of the offense, if that is possible. Thus,  for example, the 
vengeful conception of desert is thought to support the use of the 
death penalty in cases of murder. 34 
In contrast, deontological and empirical conceptions of desert have 
no such interest in the method of punishment. Their focus is on the 
amount of punishment - an amount that will put the offender in his 
proper ordinal rank according to his blameworthiness . As long as the 
3� A. von H i rsch. Pasr or Furure Crimes: Deserl'edness and Dangerousness in the Sentencing of 
Criminals ( New Brunswick 1 98 5 ) . pp. 39-46. 
33 See the discussion of  l imiting retributivism at Part I II . D .  
3 4  See, e.g., J .  Vorenberg. Criminal La11' and Procedure, 2 n d  ed. (New York 1 98 1  ) .  p.40. 
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total pumtlve "bi te" of the punishment achieves this ranking, these 
conceptions of desert have little reason to care about the method by 
which that amount of punitive "bite" is imposed . 35 
While a variety of different sanctioning methods might be used, the 
offender should get punishment "credit" for each only in proportion 
to the punitive "bite" of that method. This requires, then , establish­
ment of ratios between the different punishment methods that reflect 
the differences in their punitive "bite . "  I f  the "bite" of one week in jai l  
is equivalent to that of a month of weekends in jai l  or  is equivalent to 
that of 80 hours of community service, these conceptions of desert 
would be satisfied with any of these sentences, so long as that amount 
of punishment was the amount deserved given the offender's blame­
worthiness. The ideal equivalency table would be one that generates 
alternative sanctions about which an offender and a community are 
indifferent as to which is imposed . 36 
E. Deontological Versus Empirical Desert 
The discussions above suggest that deontological desert and empirical 
desert have many similarities. M ost importantly, they both focus upon 
the blameworthiness of the offender. But there also are important 
differences between these two conceptions of desert , as one might 
expect, given that the notions of blameworthiness upon which they are 
based are quite different . The deontological conception of desert is 
based upon reasoned analysis from principles of right and good, which 
produce a transcendent notion of justice independent of the intuitions 
of justice of the community. The empirical conception of desert has no 
such independent basis .  I t  does not look to true moral blame­
worthiness in any transcendent sense; it looks only to people's shared 
intuitions about assigning blameworthiness . 
These differences in underlying criterion can produce important 
differences in the distribution of liability and punishment .  For 
example, moral philosophers disagree about the significance of  
resulting harm - for example, whether to punish completed attempts 
the same as the substantive offense - and each side of the debate has 
plausible arguments to make. In contrast, all available data suggest a 
nearly universal and deeply held view among the community that 
resulting harm does matter, that it increases an offender's deserved 
punishment. 37 This is only one of a host of issues on which moral 
3 5  See. for example, l'vl. S. Moore. ··The Moral Worth of Retribution. in Responsibility. Character 
and Emotions" in F .  Schocman (ed.). Rnponsihi/itr. Clwruclc'l'. and rlzc Enwrions (Cambridge 
1988). p.l 80. 
'" For discussion of punishment "bite" equivalency tables. see text accompanying note 56. below. 
37 See. e.g .. Robinson and Darley. Jusrice. Liuhilitr and Blum!'. above note 28. at 14--28. 181-96: J .  
H .  Mansfield et a!.. "Comment. C ausation i n  the Law" ( 1964) 1 7  Yand. L .  Rev. 487. 494-95. 
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philosophy's analytic conclusions may vary from the empirical data on 
lay persons' intuitions of justice.38 
Perhaps even more important than such differences in blame­
worthiness judgments are the differences between the underlying 
theories that drive the two conceptions of desert and that thereby 
shape their application. In its most fundamental form, the difference is 
this :  The special value of the empirical conception of desert is its 
utilitarian effectiveness in crime-control; the special value of the 
deontological conception of desert is its ability to produce true 
principles of justice independent of personal or community opinion. 
1. The Utility of Desert 
As has been suggested elsewhere, 39 there are good arguments to 
suggest that there is great utility in a distribution of liability and 
punishment according to people's shared intuitions of justice, perhaps 
greater than the utility of distributing liability and punishment in the 
traditional utilitarian manner (to optimise deterrence, rehabilitation, 
or incapacitation) .  To summarise the arguments briefly:  
First, some of the system's power to control conduct derives from 
its potential to stigmatise violators - with some potential offenders this 
is a more powerful, yet essentially cost-free, control mechanism 
compared to imprisonment. Yet the system's ability to stigmatise 
depends upon it having moral credibility with the community . That is, 
for a conviction to trigger stigmatisation, the law must have earned a 
reputation for accurately assessing from the community's view what 
does and does not deserve moral condemnation. Liability and 
punishment rules that deviate from a community's shared intuitions 
of justice undercut this reputation. 
Second, the effective operation of the criminal justice system 
depends upon the cooperation or at least the acquiescence of those 
involved in i t :  - offenders; judges; jurors; witnesses; prosecutors; 
police; and others . To the extent that people see the system as unjust, 
as in conflict with their intuitions about justice, that acquiescence and 
cooperation is likely to fade and be replaced with subversion and 
resistance . And offenders may be inspired to fight the adjudication and 
correctional processes rather than to participate and acquiesce in it. I f  
people see the system as failing t o  d o  justice, i t  may inspire, i n  its may 
be the most dramatic reaction, vigilantism, but also may inspire other 
.1R  For community views on a wide variety of criminal law issues. see P .  H .  Robinson. ''The Role of 
M oral Phi losophers in the Competition Between P h ilosophical and Empirical. Desert" (2007) 48 
Wm. and Mary L .  Rev. 1 8 3 1 - 1 843. 
'� For a fuller acco unt see Robinson and Darley, ' 'Util ity of Desert" ,  note 27 above; P . H .  
Robinson and J .  Darley, " Intuitions o f  Justice: I mplications for Criminal L a w  and J ustice 
Policy" (2007) 8 1  So. Calif .  L. Rev. I. 
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less dramatic but more common distortions of the system. A lack of 
credibility of either sort, regular injustice or failures of justice, can 
provoke resistance and subversion. Jurors may disregard their jury 
instructions. Police officers, prosecutors, and judges may make up 
their own rules . Witnesses may lose an incentive to offer accurate 
information or testimony. 
Perhaps the greatest utility of desert comes through a more subtle 
but potentially more influential form. The real power to gain 
compliance with society's rules of prescribed conduct lies not in the 
threat of official criminal sanction, but in the forces of social influence . 
The networks of interpersonal relationships in which people find 
themselves, the social norms and prohibitions shared among those 
relationships and transmitted through those social networks, and the 
internalised representations of those norms and moral precepts control 
people's conduct . The law is not irrelevant to these social and personal 
forces. Criminal law, in particular, plays a central role in creating and 
maintaining the social consensus necessary for sustaining moral 
norms . In fact, in a society as diverse as ours, the criminal law may 
be the only society-wide mechanism that transcends cultural and 
ethnic differences . Thus, the criminal law's most important real-world 
effect may be its ability to assist in the building, shaping, and 
maintaining of these norms and moral principles . It can contribute to 
and harness the compliance-producing power o f  interpersonal 
relationships and personal morality. 
Finally, the criminal law also can have effect in gaining compliance 
with its commands through another mechanism: If it earns a 
reputation as a reliable statement of what the community perceives 
as condemnable, people are more l ikely to defer to its commands as 
morally authoritative and as appropriate to follow in those borderline 
cases in which the propriety of certain conduct is  unsettled or 
ambiguous in the mind of the actor .  The importance of this role 
should not be underestimated; in a society with the complex 
interdependencies characteristic of ours, an apparently harmless 
action can have destructive consequences . When the action is 
criminalised by the legal system, one would want the citizen to 
"respect the law" in such an instance even though he or  she does not 
immediately intuit why that action is banned . Such deference will be 
facilitated if citizens are disposed to believe that the law is an accurate 
guide to appropriate prudential and moral behaviour. 
The extent of the criminal law's effectiveness in all these respects -
in bringing the power of stigmatisation to bear, in avoiding resistance 
and subversion to a system perceived as unjust, in faci litating, 
communicating, and maintaining societal consensus on what is and 
is not condemnable, and in gaining compliance in borderline cases 
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through deference to its moral authority - is to a great extent 
dependent on the degree to which the criminal law has gained moral 
credibility in the minds of the citizens governed by it. Thus, the 
criminal law's moral credibility is essential to effective crime control, 
and is enhanced if the distribution of criminal l iability is perceived as 
"doing justice ,"  that is,  if it assigns l iability and punishment in ways 
that the community perceives as consistent with its shared intuitions of 
justice. Conversely, the system's moral credibility, and therefore its 
crime control effectiveness, is undermined by a distribution of liability 
that deviates from community perceptions of just desert . 
2. The Problem of Immoral Intuitions 
While empirical desert has the advantage of crime control utility, its 
reliance upon the community's intuitions of justice presents a serious 
disadvantage. The community's intuitions of justice could be wrong, 
even if there is a high degree of agreement about them. Empirical 
desert can tell us only what people think is just; only deontological 
desert can tell us what is actually just .  Like slave owners in the Old 
South or anti-Semitic Germans before World War II, one may fail  to 
appreciate the injustice of one's views until later, especially if  one's 
views at the time are shared by a large number of other people . Even a 
popular liability or punishment rule may be unjust. Only deontological 
desert can spot these justice errors in people's intuitions and can 
provide a conception of desert that transcends time, community, and 
culture .  Only deontological desert can give us the means by which we 
can tell the truth of what is deserved, insulated from the vicissitudes of 
human irrationality . 
I I I .  RESULTING CONFUSIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF DESERVED 
PUNISHMENT 
I t  is argued here that the failure to appreciate the existence of these 
three quite different conceptions of desert - vengefuL deontological, 
and empirical - commonly leads to confusion in the critique of desert 
as a principle for the distribution of criminal liability and punishment . 
That is, criticisms of "desert" are sometimes offered without 
appreciating that the criticism may be valid with regard to one 
conception of desert but not another, thus leading writers to reject 
"desert" generally while in fact their criticisms only suggest rejecting 
one or another specific conception of desert . Further, even when the 
issue is not the propriety of desert as a distributive principle generally 
but rather its implications on a specific issue - such as whether it calls 
for use of prison or the death penalty - the failure to appreciate the 
existence of these different conceptions of desert leads writers to use 
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arguments rightly critical of one conception of desert to draw 
conclusions that they apply to a different conception of desert . 
Consider the range of criticisms offered against desert . 
A. Harsh? 
The most common American complaint against a desert-based 
distribution is that it necessarily provides "harsh" or "severe" 
punishment . 40 As one writer explains, the desert model "is an 
articulation at the practical , policy level of the new law and order 
ideology which has replaced the liberal , social democratic consensus 
that saw crime as a symptom of deprivation or malaise. Disillusion 
with the effects of the model in practice should lead to a profound 
dislike of its principles, and its inherent, inevitable, right-wing, 
repressive slant should be acknowledged. "41 
Because vengeful desert focuses primarily on the harm done,  with 
little reference to the offender's situation and capabilities, i t  is easy to 
see how the resulting punishment can be perceived as being overly 
harsh (at least from the perspective of deontological or empirical 
desert) ,  for it ignores many factors that both moral philosophers and 
the community would think are relevant in assessing blameworthiness .  
Thus, while the harshness criticism may seem valid when applied to 
vengeful desert, it is misguided when applied to deontological and 
empirical desert . Indeed, the primary criterion of deontological desert 
is that the punishment be precisely that which is deserved, no more and 
no less . Similarly, empirical desert seeks to give the offender exactly 
what he deserves according to principles of justice derived from the 
community's intuitions of justice . I t  would be odd indeed, then, to find 
substantial complaint that an empirical desert distribution was j udged 
to be systematically harsh. 
Of course, any particular writer may have his or her own particular 
views about exactly what desert requires . And often a criticism that 
''desert" is too harsh or severe (or not harsh or severe enough) is 
simply a product of that person's particular view. Thus, a writer may 
believe that "economic, social ,  cultural, or psychological depriva­
tions" should excuse criminal conduct, and therefore may conclude 
that a criminal justice system that does not embody this view is 
"harshly punitive."42 But this kind of criticism must be taken for what 
�0 E. Rubin. "Just Say No To Retribution'' (2003 ) 7 Buff. Crim. L .  Rev. 1 7 . 58 ;  C .  H aney. 
"Psychology and the Limits to Prison Pain" ( 1 997 )  3 Psych. Pub. Pol. and L .  499, 525. 528; G.  C.  
Thomas !II and D. Edelman, ·'An Evaluation of  Conservation Crime Control Theology" ( 1988)  
63 Notre Dame L .  Rev. 1 23 .  125; M.  Tonry. ''Theories and Policies Underlying Guidelines 
Systems" (2005) 1 05 Colum. L. Rev. 1233. 1264. 
�1 B. Hudson. Justice rhrouglz Punishment: A Critique of rhe '"Justice'" iv!odel ol Corrections 
(London 1 98 7 ). ch. 6. 
4:; D. Dolinko. "Three M i stakes of Retributivism" ( 1 992)  39 U.C.L.A. Law Review 1 624. 1 657 .  
C. L .J.  Modern Desert 1 57 
it is: not a compelling indictment of deontological or empirical desert 
as being systematically harsh but simply evidence that this writer 
disagrees with others about what such desert requires. (Both 
community views and most moral philosophers in fact would 
recognise that it is possible for "economic, social , cultural, or 
psychological deprivations" to have an effect on deserved punishment, 
but only if such deprivations significantly reduced an offender's 
capacity to remain law-abiding. ) 
In  the same vein, another writer attacks desert as being unj ust 
because, he argues, in setting offence grades it distinguishes between 
an attempt and a completed offense.43 But, again, this only illustrates 
that this writer thinks that doing justice requires a different rule - in 
this case that it ought not take account of resulting harm. Others, of 
course, disagree. (In fact, deontologists disagree among themselves about 
many aspects about what desert requires, the subject of Part I I I .  E . )  I t  can 
hardly be a criticism of deontological desert generally that not all moral 
philosophers agree with your view of what desert requires. 
This kind of criticism has no more impact when directed against 
empirical desert: it only tells us one person 's  perspective on desert , 
which may or may not reflect the community's view. Such dissenting 
views can be a useful piece of data for the social scientists, but only one 
piece. In the instance of the first example above - the view that 
"economic, social, cultural, or psychological deprivations" by 
themselves (without substantially impairing one's capacity to avoid 
offending) should excuse criminal conduct - the data point is a 
significant outlier; few people would take this view. Again, it is hardly 
an indictment of empirical desert that there is not complete unanimity 
on every principle of justice. 
Contrast this with application of the same complaint against 
vengeful desert . There the complaint goes not simply to a disagreement 
with one or another liability rule but to the foundational criterion by 
which punishment is to be distributed: to match the suffering caused 
the victim. In that context, the complaint may have traction, for the 
distributive criterion of vengeful desert fails to take account of factors, 
such as culpable state of mind and excusing conditions, thus will 
regularly and systematically produce punishment that is unduly harsh, 
at least from the point of view of deontological and empirical desert . 
B. Based on Anger and Hatred? 
A related complaint against desert is its "legitimation and even 
glorification of anger and hatred. "44 Because it " legitimates anger and 
� 3  Rubin.  note 40 above, at 33. 
� Dolinko, "Three M istakes", above note 42. at !65 1 .  
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hatred, . . .  it virtually invites the public and the legal system to indulge 
the passion for revenge untroubled by moral qualms .45 It  will 
encourage "a peculiarly self-righteous and smug indulgence in our 
society's most punitive reflexes . "46 
Complaints that deserved punishment is necessarily the product 
anger and hatred are similar to complaints that deserved punishment is 
harsh, but also different .  One might respond to the two complaints in 
a similar way: by suggesting that each reveals a confusion between 
vengeful desert on the one hand and deontological and empirical 
desert on the other. That is, to the extent that vengeful desert is 
associated with the special view of victims, it is easy to see how that 
association might suggest anger and hatred toward the victimiser, a 
reaction often felt by victims. Thus, one might observe that 
deontological and empirical desert, in contrast to vengeful desert, 
take no such victim's perspective and therefore this complaint has no 
application to them. They focus on the offender, in particular on his 
blameworthiness, not the victim and his injury, and certainly not the 
victim's anger or hatred . Indeed, because their goal is to assess as 
accurately as possible an offender's blameworthiness , it  follows that 
the presence of anger or hatred would be anathema to these 
conceptions of desert because it risks distorting the accuracy of the 
blameworthiness judgment .47 In other words, the complaint that 
deserved punishment necessarily is the product of anger and hatred 
reflects a failure to distinguish vengeful desert on the one hand from 
deontological and empirical desert on the other - a response analogous 
to the response above to the complaint that deserved punishment is 
necessarily harsh . 
But the complaint that desert is based upon anger and hatred also 
is problematic for another reason: it is a complaint about 1notivation in 
punishing rather than about the distribution of punishment .  While the 
complaint is mixed with substantive complaints about lack of justness, 
it has nothing to do with justness .  A distribution consistent with 
deontological or empirical desert could be motivated by anger in any 
particular case or by any particular punisher, but the motivation itself 
does not make the punishment any more or less just .  The same is true 
of punishment based upon a vengeful desert distribution .  If a vengeful 
desert distribution just happens as a matter of dumb luck to produce a 
sentence that exactly matches an offender's blameworthiness in a given 
case, the fact that it is motivated by anger or hatred does not make the 
sentence unjust. And conversely, if a vengeful desert distribution 
4 5  !hid. .  at 1 652. 
4<> D. Dolinko.  - -some Thoughts About Retributivism" '  ( 199 1 )  1 0 1 Ethics 53 7, 559. 
47 Fein berg and Coleman. Philosophy of Law. note 22 above. at 794-795: J ustice Powell .  writing 
for the majority in  Buurh v. Murrland. 4 82 U.S. 496 ( 198 7). 
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produces an unjust sentence ( from the perspective of deontological or 
empirical desert) ,  the absence of anger in its imposition does not make 
i t  just. A society has every reason to want its determinations of 
punishment to be free of anger and hatred for a wide variety of 
reasons, but the presence of that emotion itself can be only the basis 
upon which to criticise the punisher, not the punishment . 
C. A Preference for Prison, or Worse? 
Desert is sometimes associated with a preference for imprisonment,48 
or worse .49 In commenting on the M odel Penal Code's recent shift to a 
desert distributive principle, one writer explains that the reform is a 
mistake "because it would align the Code with the worst features of 
contemporary American penal practice . . . the highest rate of 
incarceration in the Western world by a factor of five . [T]his trend 
has been justified . . .  by legislation that . . .  embraces the principle of 
retribution. If the [Model] Code were to embrace this principle as well, 
it would inevitably be seen as lending its support to all the 
irrationalities, immoralities, and inefficiencies of our current addiction 
to incarceration. 50 
I f, under the vengeful conception of desert, "the punishment 
should fit the crime," it might be argued that prison ought to have a 
preferred place among punishment methods because it best reproduces 
the victim's suffering, given the limitations placed on punishment 
methods by liberal democracies.  Any less severe form of punishment 
would fail to match the victim suffering caused by the offender. By the 
same token, the vengeful conception of desert might logically suggest 
the death penalty for murder . 5 1 
But, because neither deontological nor empirical desert have an 
interest in reproducing the suffering of the victim upon the offender, 
they have no reason to give special preference to prison or to any other 
punishment method. Their interest is only in insuring that a certain 
amount of punishment is imposed - the amount that will put the 
offender in his proper ordinal rank among other cases according to his 
relative blameworthiness . Any method or methods of punishment that 
achieve that result would be fully consistent with the demands of 
deontological and empirical desert .52 
Indeed, because their focus is on the amount rather than the 
method of punishment, deontological and empirical desert can provide 
4' See. r. g . ,  · · Development in l<t\v: Alternatives to I ncarceration., ( 1 998)  I l l  Harv. L .  Rev. 1 967. 
1 97 I ;  D.  McCord , " Imagi n ing a Retributivist  Alternative to Capital Punishment" 50 Fla. L. 
Rev. I ,  82 ( 1 99 8 )  
4 9  Rubin.  above note 40. a t  6 9  ( 2003 ) .  
50 Rubin. above note 40. a t  I 7 .  
5 1  Above Part l i .D.2 .  
52 Above Part I I . D.2 .  
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greater flexibility in the method by which punishment is  imposed than 
is commonly available today .53  A sentencing system or  sentencing 
judge could be allowed complete discretion in fashioning any 
particular sentencing method or combination of methods for a given 
case, as long as the total amount of punishment imposed was that 
deserved given the offender's blameworthiness . All that would be 
needed would be a table that gave punishment "credit ' '  for each 
punishment method according to the relative punitive "bite" of that 
method. Once such a table of punishment equivalencies is established 
( such tables already exist54) - setting equivalencies between fine, 
weekend jai l ,  supervised probation, community service, and other 
sanctioning methods - a sentencing judge can be left to translate a 
prison sentence into any other method or combination of  methods, so 
long as the total punitive "bite" totaled the amount deserved. 
This kind of sentencing f1exibility is particularly useful today, at a 
time when there is interest in promoting non-incarcerative sanctions. Not 
only are such sanctions typically much less costly than prison, but they 
also pennit the opportunity to avoid future crime through rehabilitation, 
incapacitation, or  deterrence, without subverting j ustice . 
D. Only Vague Demands?: "Limiting Retributivism " 
A common objection to desert as a distributive principle is that i t  is 
"too vague,"55 that, as one writer explains :  " Everyone may agree that 
five years in prison is unjustly harsh desert for shoplifting, or that a 
five dollar fine is unjustly lenient desert for rape, but beyond such clear 
cases our intuitions seem to fail us. Is two years, five years, or ten years 
the proper sanction for a rape? . . .  Our sense of just deserts here seems 
to desert us. "56 As another writer puts it, "the indeterminancy of [the 
just deserts] approach . . .  would at best achieve a system of 'equal 
misery , '  where the scale of equality was prone to f1ux ."57 
Some writers, such as Norval Morris,58 may be willing to concede 
that desert is not a hopelessly vague concept ,  that it has some meaning, 
5� Above Part 1 1 . 0.2 .  
S .J  See. e .g  . .  R. E. Harlow. J .  M. Darley and P H.  Robinson. ' ·The Severity of  I n termediate Penal 
Sanctions:  A Psychophysical Scaling Approach for Obtain ing Community Perceptions . . ( 1 99 5 )  
1 1  J .  Quanti tative Crim inology 7 1 . 85:  P .  H .  Robinson e t  a l . .  "Codifying Shar i 'a :  
International Norms, Legal i ty and the Freedom to I nvent New Forms""  ( 2007 ) 2 J .  Comp. 
Law I .  47-50. 
55 A. Ashworth. Se/1/encing and Cri111inal Jusrice. 4th ed. ( London 2000) .  p .86 .  See also B. 
Bosanquet. So111e Suggesrions in Erlncs ( London 1 9 1 8 ) .  pp. l 88. 203: J. Braithwaite and P. Petit. 
Nor Just Deserts: A Repuhlican Theon· of Cri111inal Jusrice ( New York 1 990).  p . l 80: R .A.  D u ff. 
""Penal Communications: Recent Work i n  the Phi losophy of Punishment" ( 1 996 )  20 Crime and 
Just. I .  7. 
56 L.  Katz. "Criminal  Law". in Dennis Patterson (ed . )  A Co111panion to the Philosopln· of Lmv and 
Legal Theory ( London 1 996) .  pp.S0-8 1 .  
57 A. Norrie, Crinze. Reason and Hisrvry ( London 1 993L p .2 l 8 . 
='� N. Morris. The Furure of f111prison111ent (Chicago 1 974) .  pp.75-76. 
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but would make a related but slightly different criticism: Desert cannot 
specify a particular amount of punishment that should be imposed; it 
can only identify a range of punishment that should not be imposed 
because it would be a seriously disproportionate. Indeed, this is the 
underlying assumption of the American Law Institute's recent 
amendment of M odel Penal Code Section 1 .02(2)(a) that sets out the 
purposes of the sentencing provisions and the principles governing 
their interpretation and application :  "Subsection 1 .02(2)(a)(i)  codifies 
Morris's idea of an approximate retributive ballpark when it speaks of 
a ' range of severity' of proportionate punishments. "59 
If  one has in mind the diluted version of the vengeful conception of 
desert, the claim of vagueness may make sense; the demand that  the 
punishment be "proportional" to the harm caused might seem to leave a 
good deal of flexibility in application. That proportionality requirement 
might be taken to suggest only the need for an approximation. On the 
other hand, the strict form of lex talionis - that punishment "should 
correspond in degree and in kind to the offense of the wrongdoer''60 is not 
so vague . (Admittedly, there may remain some application questions: 
Exactly how is victim suffering to be measured, and how is it to be 
reproduced? Doesn't every victim experience a crime differently?) 
But the same vagueness complaint is even more misguided when 
applied to deontological and empirical desert, with their focus on 
offender blameworthiness rather than on victim suffering, although 
the vagueness complaint is made about blameworthiness tooY Such 
complaints are based in part on a failure to appreciate the specific 
demands of these two conceptions of desert : the demands of ordinal 
ranking, as opposed to the issue of punishment continuum endpoint, 
as discussed in Part I I . D . l .  
Those who complain about desert's  vagueness seem to assume, 
incorrectly, that deontological and empirical desert seek to provide a 
universal, absolute amount of punishment deserved for a given 
offense. But deontological and empirical desert make no such claim. 
The goal of empirical and deontological desert is to ensure that 
offenders of different blameworthiness are given different amounts of 
punishment, each to receive an amount that reflects their differences in 
blameworthinessY And that ordinal ranking does not require a 
5� MPC Amendment. note 6 above, at 8. The new Subsection also signals its reliance upon this  
notion of desert as setting only outer boundaries of  disproportional ity . when i t  refers to · · the 
boundaries of  sentence severity permitted in  Subsection ( a )( i )  
. .  
60 See note above. 
6 1  Morris, note 58 above. at 74. Other writers have expressed similar views in di fferent terms. See. 
e .g  . . P . H .  Rossi and R . A .  Berk. Just Punish11 1ents: Federal Guidelines and Puhiic VieH·s Cu111parnl 
( New York 1 99 7 )  pp.2-3: H .A. Bedau. "Retributivism and the Theory of Punishmen t" ( 1 97 8 )  75 
J .  Phi l .  60 1 .  6 1 3 . 
62 See J. Kleinig. Punish111ent and Desert (Amsterdam 1 973) .  p. 1 1 4: von H i rsch. Past ur Fulllre 
Cri111es. note 32 above. 
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specific amount of punishment in a universal sense. It requires imposition 
of only that specific amount of punishment that will put the offender at 
his appropriate ordinal rank given punishment continuum endpoin t  of that 
societyY That is, the uncertainty about deserved punishment amount 
that Morris and others observe arises not because of any vagueness in the 
ordinal ranking of offenses according to offender blameworthiness but 
rather because of differences in opinion about the punishment 
continuum endpoint that a society might adopt. 
Deontological and empirical conceptions of desert may have 
something useful to say about placing the punishment continuum 
endpoint, but the nature of their contribution on this point is  quite 
different than when they serve as a distributive principle for 
punishment :  here they identify only extremes beyond which placement 
of the endpoint would be problematic . For example, the rationale 
behind empirical desert suggests a limit to the punishment continuum 
endpoint :  It should not be placed at a point that is either so low or so 
high that it will have the effect of undermining the community's 
collective judgment about whether the criminal justice system is in fact 
doing justice. Notice that this judgment is one that is necessarily 
culturally dependent .  One community might accept stoning to death as 
being an acceptable end point,64 while another could reject  fifteen 
years imprisonment as too harsh on endpoint . 65 
This means, for example, that a society might look to other 
purposes in setting the punishment continuum endpoint - perhaps 
optimising deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation - and deonto­
logical and empirical desert would have no objection . It is likely this 
flexibility as to setting the punishment continuum endpoint has misled 
writers into thinking that conceptions of desert are necessarily vague. 
I t  is in this project, setting the punishment continuum endpoint, that 
"limiting retributivism" is a useful concept. The error of those 
promoting the concept is only in failing to see that it has application 
only in this l imited role, and has no application in the primary 
function of desert in serving as a principle for determining how 
criminal liability and punishment is to be distributed along that 
punislmzent continuum . 
But this does not entirely settle the vagueness complaint against 
deontological and empirical desert . Some writers argue that even 
('3 P.  H. Robinson . . .  The A . L I . ' s  Proposed Distributive Principle of 'Limit ing Retr ibut ivism': Does 
It Mean in  Practice Anything Other than Pure DesenT ( 2003 ) 1 7  Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 3 .  
6� One of t h e  traditional hudud punishments for a married person who commits adultery (::ina) i s  
s toning to death.  I .  R ushd. The Distinguished Jurist 's Primer ( lmran Ahsan Khan Nyazee trans. , 
Reading 1 994), p .523;  M .  Iqbal Siddiqi .  The Penal L({lr ojl slwn ( Lahore 1 97 9 ). p . 5 1  ( 1 979) :  US 
. 
Dep't of  State, Country Reports on Human Rights  Practices for 1 993.  at 1 372 ( 1 994). 
"> For example, the average offender in the Netherlands was released after 5 months: United 
Nations Survey of" Crime Trends and Operations of" Criminal Justice S\".1'/ems. at 308 .  
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ordinal ranking is something that can be done only in the vaguest 
terms, that establishing specific rankings is impossible .66 Many moral 
philosophers may have an answer to this challenge and may be able to 
give a reasoned account of how to make the kinds of judgments called 
for here.67 But it is admittedly a problem for deontological desert as a 
distributive principle that different moral philosophers will have 
different answers. This is not a problem of vagueness, however, but 
rather a problem of disagreement, which is the subject of Part I I I . E  
immediately below. The disagreement may make i t  difficult to 
operationalise a criminal justice system based upon the deontological 
conception of desert , an issue discussed in Part I I I . H . ,  but the point 
here is simply there is nothing in principle to suggest that 
deontological desert could not produce a principled system for the 
ordinal ranking of offenses . 
As to empirical desert, it might still be argued that the blame­
worthiness ranking of offenses is beyond the ability of people's 
intuitions of justice, that those intuitions are simply too vague to do 
more than to roughly distinguish between "serious" cases and "not 
serious" cases and cannot provide the nuance needed to do more.  But 
a wide variety of empirical studies paint a dramatically different 
picture .6s In some studies subjects were asked to put offenses or offense 
scenarios into one of a set of predetermined categories; in another kind 
of study, subjects were asked to rank order offenses or offense 
scenarios; in a third kind of study, subjects were asked to assign 
numerical values to each of a number of offenses or offense 
scenarios.69 The results in all of these studies are consistent : Subjects 
displayed considerable nuance in the j udgments they make. 70 Small 
changes in facts produce large and predictable changes in punishment. 
Durham summarises the surveys this way: "Virtually without 
exception, citizens seem able to assign highly specific sentences for 
highly specific events . "7 1  The conclusion suggested by the empirical 
evidence is that people take account of a wide variety of factors and 
often give them quite different effect in different situations. That is, 
people's intuitions of justice are not vague or simplistic, as claimed, 
but rather sophisticated and complex . 
66 R. L. Christopher . . . Deterring Retributivism: The I njustice of · Just' Punishment . . ( 2002) 96 N w. 
U . L. Rev. 843 . 893 ( footnotes omitted). 
67 See A. von Hirsch. ·'Proportionate Sentences: A Desert Perspective in Principled Sentencing .. in 
A. von Hirsch and A. Ashworth (eds. )  Readings on Theory and Policy, 2nd ed. ( lo ndon 1 998 ) 
1 73-74. 
68 For a general discussion of these matters. see Robinson and Kurzban. "Concordance and 
Contlict' ' .  note 29 above. at Parts I -I I I .  
" 9  ! d .  a t  Parts I and I I .  
70 l d .  a t  Part I .  
7 1  A. M .  Durhan1 l i  L . . Public Opinion Regard ing Sentences for Crin1e: Does i t  Exist?'. ( 1 993 ) 2 1  J .  
Crim. Justice I ,  2. 
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What this suggests is that, while the vagueness complaint may be 
valid with regard to vengeful desert, i t  is misguided when applied to 
deontological desert, at least in principle, and simply wrong in both 
principle and practice when applied to empirical desert . 
E. Subject to Profound Disagreement? 
Another common objection to using desert as a distributive principle 
for criminal liability and punishment is the concern that, even if 
individual people have a clear notion of what desert demands, it is 
simply "too open to divergent interpretations ." 72 
Against this complaint, both vengeful and deontological desert 
have weak responses.  The problem for vengeful desert arises from the 
vagueness of its criterion:  the vagueness of "proportionality" to victim 
suffering and the subjectivity inherent in the victim perspective . The 
problem for deontological desert is different . The focus of its 
distributive principle is fixed and specific - an offender's moral 
blameworthiness - but moral philosophers simply disagree about just 
how this principle translates into specific punishment in a given case. 
"The Retributivist label . . .  might not seem particularly useful,  for the 
differences on particular issues among some retributivists may seem 
greater than the differences between some retributivists and some 
utilitarians .  73 
The same too-much-disagreement complaint has been made about 
people's intuitions of justice, which would leave empirical desert in a 
similar situation. I t  is the common wisdom that little agreement exists 
among people's intuitions of justice . 74 But the common wisdom simply 
does not match the empirical reality. In fact, empirical studies show 
broadly-shared intuitions that serious wrongdoing should be pun­
ished, and broadly shared intuitions about the relative b lameworthi­
ness of different cases. 75 The striking extent of the agreement on 
intuitions of justice is il lustrated in a recent study that asked subjects 
to rank order 24 crime scenario descriptions according to the amount 
of punishment deserved. The researchers found that the subjects 
displayed an astounding level of agreement in the ordinal ranking of 
the scenarios. Subjects agreed with the modal ranking of the group for 
96 percent of their pairwise ranking judgments. The most common 
deviation, as one might guess, was for a subject to "fl ip" the ranking 
72 Ashworth. note 55 above, at  86.  
73 M .  Tunick. Punishmenl: Theon· and PraC!ice ( Berkeley 1 992)  p . l 07 .  
7 �  1 .  Monahan, "'The Case for Prediction in t h e  Modi fied Desert Model of  Criminal  Sentencing" 
( 1 982 )  5 Int ' l J .  L .  and Psychiatry 1 0 3. 1 05;  M. Tonry, ' ·Obsolescence and I mm anence in Penal 
Theory and Policy" (2005 ) 1 05 Colum . L .  Rev. 1 233 ,  1 263;  Dolinko. ' 'Three M istakes". note 42 
above. at 1 638-39; E. van den H aag. "Punishment:  Desert and Crime Control" ( 1 98 7 )  85 M ich.  
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of two scenarios that were adjacent in the group's modal ranking - for 
example, a subject might rank order the scenarios as S6, S8 ,  S7,  S9 ,  
"flipping" the S7 and S8 scenarios.  I f  these simple "flips" of adjacent 
scenarios are excluded, the percentage of all rankings that deviate from 
the group mode rankings is 2. 7 percent . In, other words, "flips" aside, 
subjects agreed with the modal ranking of the group in 97 .7 percent of 
their pairwise judgments . 
A more sophisticated statistical measure of concordance is found in 
Kendall ' s  W coefficient of concordance, in which 1 .0 indicates perfect 
agreement and 0 .0  indicates no agreement. In this study, the Kendall ' s  
W is .95  (with p < .00 1 ) , an  astounding level of agreement. One might 
expect to get this high a Kendall 's  W if  subjects were asked to judge 
the relative brightness of different groupings of spots, for example.  
When asked to perform more subjective or complex comparisons, such 
asking travel magazine readers to rank the attractiveness of eight 
different travel destinations, one gets a Kendal l ' s  W of . 52 .  When 
asking economists to rank the top 20 economics journals according to 
quality, one gets a Kendall 's W. of .095 .  
Indeed, the ordinal ranking of deserved punishment in different 
cases generally is consistent across demographics, including cultural 
differences examined in cross-cultural studies that replicated domestic 
studies. Typical of the conclusions in these studies, Newman reports 
that, "it is apparent that there was considerable agreement as to the 
amount of punishment appropriate to each act" and that looking at 
relative rankings indicates "general agreement in ranks across all 
countries. " 76 
The level of agreement is strongest for those core wrongs with 
which criminal law primarily concerns itself - physical aggression, 
taking property, and deception in exchanges - and becomes less 
pronounced as the nature of the offence moves farther from the core of 
wrongdoing. But even where there is disagreement, empirical desert 
offers means by which the disagreements can be resolved : by adopting 
the majority view, or adopting the view that would least undermine the 
criminal law's moral credibility with the community i t  governs .  No 
such means exists to resolve conflicting views for deontological desert . 
One may wonder how this agreement among people about 
intuitions of justice, sometimes at astonishing high levels, could have 
been missed for so many years. One may wonder how the common 
wisdom got it wrong. First, some sources of apparent disagreement are 
simply misleading. When a case in the headlines has social or political 
implications, it is common that its relevant facts will be perceived 
differently by different people . What one makes of the police 
76 Id. at  1 40-- 1 4 1  ( see Table 1 2. pp. l 42- 1 43 ) .  
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testimony in the O.J.  Simpson case or the Rodney King case may 
depend upon how one has come to view police officers from one's 
daily l ife experiences.  77 If people draw different conclusions from the 
testimony, they are l ikely to have different views of the relevant facts 
of the case, which would predict different views on the liability and 
punishment deserved .  
Another source of apparent disagreement i s  found in  the ordinal 
ranking versus endpoint distinction, discussed in Part I I . D . l :  While 
people may agree on the relative b lameworthiness of a set of cases,  
some people may prefer generally harsher punishments than other 
people. That is, some people may set the most severe end of the 
punishment continuum noticeably higher than others, which would 
predict different sentences, even if  the people agree on the relative 
blameworthiness of the different offenders . 
F Fails to A void A voidable Crime? 
The central criticism of desert in the English debate is that it  is not the 
best crime control policy. On the contrary, it is said to fail  in avoiding 
crimes that could be avoided by relying upon other principles, 
primarily deterrence or incapacitation. 78 Such dis utility is obviously 
objectionable to utilitarians . And many would make the claim that 
such disutility is particularly objectionable in the case of punishment : 
" [P]unishment - the intentional infliction of pain - is senseless and even 
cruel if it does no good, and yet retributivists favor precisely that, i . e . ,  
the infl iction of pain that need not  result in  future benefit ."79 This sort 
of objection has been aimed at the desert approach embodied in the 
Criminal Justice Act 1 99 1 . 80 
Traditionally, the utilitarian preference has been for distributing 
liability to optimise deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation, or some 
combination of them. 8 1  And those consequentialists who seek to 
minimise future crime would be right to point out that deontological 
desert as a distributive principle would allow future crimes that could 
have been avoided by a utilitarian distributive principle, such as one 
that relied upon these traditional utilitarian distributive principles. 
But of course this classic challenge of utilitarianism to deontolo­
gical desert does not work against empirical desert because the latter's 
distribution of liability and punishment is specifically designed to 
7 7  See Robinson a n d  Darley, Jusrice. Liahilifl' uml Blallll!, note 28 above. 
n L. Kaplow and S. Shavel l .  ' ' Fairness Vers"us  Welt�uc" (2000 ) 1 1 4 H arv. L .  Rev. 96 1 ,  1 007:  E. 
Luna, "Punishment Theory, H olism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice" 
2003 Utah Law Review 205. 
79 J .  Dressler. Undersfw11iing Criminal Lml', 4th ed . .  ( New York 2006) p .22.  
�0 A.  Sanders. "What Principles Underlie Criminal Justice Policies in  the l 990's'l'' ( 1 998)  18  Oxford 
J .  Legal Stud. 533.  538 .  
"1 See, e.g. Model Penal Code § 1 .02( l )  ( 1 962).  
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m1mmise future crime - by harnessing the crime-control power of  
social influence that comes with building the criminal law's moral 
credibility .�2 In other words, empirical desert is a utilitarian, 
consequentialist theory of punishment. It is building the community's 
perception that justice is being done that pays crime-control dividends, 
not the system's actual success as measured by deontological desert . 
G. Immoral? 
Just as the utilitarian objection of poor crime-control has been levelled 
at a desert distribut ive principle - with some force when applied to 
deontological desert but missing the mark when applied to empirical 
desert - the reverse sort of objection also can be made: that a desert 
distribution is immoral .83  Some writers complain about "the inj ustice 
of 'just' punishment. "84 
As one might expect, the response to the immorality complaint is 
essentially the reverse of the response to the disutility complaint 
discussed in the previous section:  The objection may have weight 
against empirical desert but makes little sense with regard to 
deontological desert. That is, while moral philosophers may well 
disagree among themselves about how to translate desert into specific 
principles of justice, al l  would agree that the primary goal of  a 
deontological desert distribution would be to produce criminal liability 
and punishment that was, above all else, moral . 
On the other hand, the criticism is fair when applied to empirical 
desert : What empirical desert produces is not justice, but only liability 
and punishment consistent with the community's views about what 
constitutes justice. 85 The community's intuitions of justice could be 
wrong, even if there is a high degree of agreement about them. At any 
particular time and place, there may be widespread support for the 
morality of conduct that only later is revealed to be immoral and 
unjust,  as with slave owning. To protect against this error, to be able 
to identify when people's  shared intuitions of justice are unjust, a 
system must turn to deontological desert to provide that transcendent 
check on the justness of its liability rules .  It is only deontological desert 
that can give us the truth of what is deserved, insulated from the 
vicissitudes of human irrationality and emotions. 
, ,  
· - Above Part  I I .  E . l .  
'3 See. for example. Luna. · ·Punishment Theory . . . note 78 above: J .  G.  M urphy. · ·symposium on 
Kantian Legal Theory: Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?"" ( 1 98 7 )  87  Colum . L.  Rev. 
509. 5 1 7 : Dolinko. Three M i stakes. note 42 above. at  1 63 5 .  
<' .J  Ch ristopher. · · I nj ustice of Just Punishment . . . note 6 6  above. As one writer expresses in  a related 
concern. · · Just deserts tends to mean fai r  distribution within an existing penalty system. 
regardless of  whether that system is  itself just . · · D .  J. Gall igan. · ·Guidelines and Just Deserts :  A 
Critique of Recent Trends in Sentencing Reform" 1 98 1  Crim. L . R .  297. 305. 
'' M . S .  Moore. Pluci11g Blame. u Generol Theury of' the Criminal Lcnr (Oxford 1 997) .  pp. 207-208 .  
1 68 The Cambridge Lm v Journal [2008] 
But an examination of the modern methodology of moral 
philosophers suggests that they sometimes fai l  to appreciate the 
importance of the difference between deontological and empirical 
desert. They commonly rely heavily upon intuitions of j ustice in their 
analyses, and thereby bias their conclusions in favor of principles of  
j ustice that match people's shared intuitions of justice. That reduces 
the extent to which moral philosophy can be relied upon to provide the 
transcendent check that empirical desert needs . 
The current methodology of moral philosophers relies upon 
intuitions of justice in a variety of ways . A standard analytic form, 
if not the standard form, among moral philosophers today is to test 
variations in a series of hypotheticals according to philosophers' own 
intuitions about the proper resolution of each, as a basis for building 
moral principles, as in Rawls' "reflective equilibrium. "86 The 
differences in their judgments about the intuitively proper resolution 
of different hypotheticals are used as data points, as it were, from 
which philosophers derive a moral principle, which can in turn be 
tested and refined by testing that moral principle against the 
philosophers' intuitions in new sets of hypotheticalsY 
But the methodological reliance on intuitions of  j ustice creates a 
bias in favor of  moral principles that are consistent with intuitions .  
Moral principles with principled, reasoned support might nonetheless 
fai l  to gain currency among philosophers or might be discarded, 
simply because philosophers as a group think their results inconsistent 
with intuitions - a practical veto by philosophers' shared intuitions . 88 
H. Irnpractical to Implement? 
It is common for writers to think it impractical to construct a working 
criminal justice system based upon desert principles. For  example, in 
the internal debates among commissioners during the drafting of the 
United States Sentencing Commission guidelines, it  was argued that 
"j ust desert" could not be used as a basis for drafting sentencing 
guidelines because of "its impracticability," and because of "its 
incompatibility with administrative and procedural requirements of 
sentencing. "89 Yet, as  noted previously, the American Law Institute 
recently adopted desert as the distributive principle for the Model 
Penal Code .90 I s  it ,  or is it not, possible to implement a distributive 
x6 J .  Rawls, A Theory of luslice ( Cambridge 1 97 1 ) , p.48 . 
87 ibid.; L. Katz, · ' Incommensurable Choices and the Problem of Moral I gnorance" ( 1 99 8 )  1 46 U.  
Pa .  L .  Rev. 1 465, 1 482-83 .  
s s  Robinson, " Moral Philosophers··. note 38 above. 
89 ! . H .  NageL ' "Supreme Court Review: Foreword: Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines New Federal ( 1 990) 80 J . Crim. L. and Crimi n ology 883. 920. 
�IJ See MPC Amendment, above note 6. Desert here is set as an absolute; other principles can be 
relied upon only if they are effective and are not inconsistent with desert. 
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principle based upon desert? Again,  the answer depends upon which 
conception of desert one has in mind. 
· 
I t  follows from what has been said above that it would be difficult 
to produce a system of criminal liability and punishment based upon 
vengeful desert . Vengeful desert fails to provide enough specificity as 
to the exact criterion for distributing liability and punishment .  What 
exactly is meant by the requirement that the punishment be 
"proportionate" to the harm caused by the offense?9 ' I f  proportion­
ality were taken to mean ordinal ranking along a fixed continuum, as 
in deontological and empirical desert , i t  could be translated into 
specific sentences , but, by itself, connected only to a concept of extent 
of victim suffering, it can give only general guidance .92 Part of the 
problem is the potentially subjective nature of the criterion. If the 
offender's punishment is to match the victim's suffering,93 a 
determination of the punishment deserved cannot be made upon the 
objective facts of the offense but requires an examination of how much 
this particular victim suffered from the offense. These are not 
unsurmountable barriers, but coming as they do in the context of 
the serious disagreements over just what vengeful desert requires,94 and 
in the absence of any authoritative mechanism by which these 
disagreements can be resolved, i t  does seem impractical to think that 
vengeful desert could be used as the distributive principle for the 
creation and operation of a working criminal justice system. 
Nor is it clear that deontological desert can provide the basis for a 
working distributive principle. Deontological desert may work in 
principle to provide a specific sentence for each case, but i t  may not be 
realistic to rely upon it in practice. The substantial disagreements 
among moral philosophers about many, if not most, issues concerning 
the principles of justice, and the lack of an effective means by which 
people, non-philosophers especially, can reliably choose between these 
cont1icting views, means that while any single moral philosopher might 
be able to produce a system for distributing punishment, i t  may be 
difficult to produce an authoritative deontological-desert-based 
system. 
Can empirical desert be the practical basis for a working criminal 
justice system? The common wisdom is no, because of concerns about 
lack of nuance and agreement discussed earlier. For example, Justice 
Breyer cites lack of nuance to explain his opposition to basing the 
United States Sentencing Commission sentencing guidelines on desert : 
"Considering the inherent subjectivity . . . only a crude ranking of 
Y I  See notes 1 6- 1 8. above. 
9=' See text accompanying notes 56-59. above. 
''� See notes 1 6- I S . above. 
''4 See Part ! ! I . E  . .  above. 
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behavior in terms of just deserts . . .  could be developed. Although 
guidelines motivated by a just deserts rationale would be cloaked in 
language and form that evoke rationality, using terms such as ' rank 
order of seriousness, ' the rankings would not, in substantive terms, be 
wholly objective . "95 He similarly argues that desert lacks the needed 
level of agreement :  "The difficulty that arises in applying [a desert 
approach] is that different Commissioners have different views about 
the correct rank order of the seriousness of different crimes. "96 
The average state criminal code distinguishes a dozen grades of  
offences .97 M odern sentencing guidelines make even more distinc­
tions .98 Presumably, sentencing judges would like to make even more 
nuanced distinctions. Are the intuitions of laypersons that support 
empirical desert nuanced enough to provide this level of  specificity? 
The discussion in Parts I I I . D .  and E. makes clear that lay intuitions of  
justice are both nuanced and the subject of much agreement, especially 
with regard to the core wrongs that make up the majority of crimes in 
practice . 99 From the point of view of empirical desert , it is of no 
significance that individual sentencing commissioners may disagree. I t  
i s  the community's shared intuitions o f  justice that should control, not 
the intuitions of the commissioners. 
And where disagreements do exist, and there will be such instances 
( especially outside the core of wrongdoing) , the logic of the empirical 
desert suggests an obvious mechanism for resolving those disagree­
ments: adopting the position that would least undermine the criminal 
justice system's moral credibility with the community, perhaps 
following the majority view in many cases but also taking account 
of arguments on the justness of its position as would come out in 
public debate. 1 00 Indeed, existing empirical studies tell us not only that 
people agree about the relative blameworthiness of different cases, but 
also do much to map for us the contours of people's agreement and 
disagreement .  And they map not only the relative seriousness of  
different wrongdoing but also the factors that increase and decrease a 
violator's blameworthiness . One collection of studies reports commu­
nity views on the liability rules that govern such widely-ranging topics 
as the objective requirements for attempt, liability for creating a 
prohibited risk, the objective requirements for complicity, the 
95 S.  Breyer. ' 'The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises U pon Which They 
Rest" ( 1 98 8 )  1 7  H o fstra L. Rev. l .  1 5- 1 7  ( 1 98 8 )  ( footnotes omitted ) .  
% Breyer, note 95 above, at  1 5- 1 6 . 
97 See. for example. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 1 3-60 1 ( 2006); Colo.  Rev. Stat. § 1 8- 1 - 1 04 ( 1 999) ;  Kan.  Stat .  
Ann. § 2 1 -4704 et seq. ( 1 995) ;  Ncb. Rev.  Stat. 28- 1 05.  1 06 ( 1 995 ) .  
98 The Uni ted States Sentencing Guidelines represent the  far end of th i s  spectrum, wi th  43  offense 
levels. US Sentencing Guidelines Manual § SA ( Nov. 2004) available at  http://www.ussc.gov/ 
2004guid/ gl2004. pdf. 
99 See text accompanying note 92. above. 
1 00 See Robinson and Kurzban. ' 'Concordance and Conflict" note 29 above. 
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requirements for omission liability, the use of force in self-defence, the 
use of force in defence of property, citizens' law enforcement 
authority, offence culpability requirements, the culpability require­
ments for complicity, the liability rules that should govern voluntary 
intoxication, insanity, immaturity, involuntary intoxication, duress, 
entrapment, the requirements of sexual offences, the significance of a 
person's causal connection with the prohibited result (causation 
requirements), the felony-murder rule, and the rules that should 
govern the punishment of multiple related offences . 1 0 1  
I t  i s  also true, however, that more research is needed. As much 
ground as the existing studies cover, they each touch only the basics in 
their specific subject . More importantly, while there is a literature 
describing the intuitions of laypersons as a group and there is  a 
literature documenting the existence of many areas of high agreement, 
these two literatures need to be combined . That is, we need to 
understand better not only the details of the community's shared 
intuitions on a wide variety of issues, but also to understand the 
contours and demographics of disagreement. 1 0� 
But one might argue that there are any number of instances in 
which one would want the system's principles of justice to deviate from 
people's intuitions of justice. Thus, it  might be argued, deviations from 
empirical desert and the concomitant undermining of the system's 
moral credibility are inevitable and, therefore, a system based upon 
empirical desert is necessarily doomed to failure. Every perceived 
deviation from desert would undermine the system's moral credibi lity 
and thereby its crime-control effectiveness. 
I t  is true that one would want to deviate from people's intuitions of 
justice, even intuitions on which there is broad agreement, for any 
number of reasons. First, people's intuitions of justice may prove to be 
immoral, in a transcendent deontological sense, as discussed in Part 
I I I . G. Further, it is clear that there exist a variety of societal interests 
that are sufficiently important to outweigh the crime-control benefits 
of an empirical desert distribution, such as fair notice, procedural 
fai rness, and the need to control police and to limit governmental 
intrusion in private lives . 1 03 Still further, a society may wish to use 
criminal law to change people's intuitions of justice, toward a view 
seen as more compatible with the societal values to which the 
1 1 "  Robinson and Darky. Juslic<'. Liuhilitr and 8/unw. note 28 above: L. D. M axfield.  W. M artin 
and C. Kitchens. "Just Punishment :  Public Perceptions and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  
Research Bul let in for the United States Sentencing Commission 
. . 
( 1 99 7 )  avai lable at http:// 
www .ussc.gov/research.htm: Memorandum from R. A. Conaboy to the Uni ted States Sentencing 
Commission. " Public Opinion on  Sen tencing Federal Crimes" ( 1 99 7 )  available at http :// 
www.ussc.gov/research . htin. 
1 "2 See Robinson and Kurzban .  ' "Concordance and Conflict". note 29 above. at Part IV. 
I l l _-, See. e. g . . P.  H. Robinson and NI . T. Cahi lL Ltn\ ·  1-Vir!Jour Justice ( Ne\v York 2006) pp.90.  1 3 7 .  
1 86 .  
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community aspires . For example, the community may decide that it 
wishes actively to change people's existing intuitions about the relative 
seriousness of drunk driving, domestic violence, same-sex intercourse, 
insider-trading, or internet-facilitated copyright piracy.  
So it is true that in any real world criminal justice system, i t  wil l  be  
inevitable that the  system will in some instances deviate from people's 
intuitions of justice. But the fact that some deviation occurs does not 
mean that the goal of building law's moral credibility necessarily fai ls .  
That is ,  there is little reason to believe that any and every deviation 
from a person's  intuitions of justice will  completely destroy the 
criminal justice system's moral credibility in that person's eyes . 
Rather, it seems more likely that the process is one of  incremental 
effect. 1 04 The better the system does at regularly tracking people's 
intuitions of justice, the stronger its moral credibility with them. The 
more it deviates from empirical desert, the lower its moral credibility. 
The conclusion, then, is not that there is no value in adopting 
empirical desert as a distributive principle but rather just the opposite: 
Given that some deviation is inevitable, the system ought not deviate 
where it can avoid doing so, in order to advance its moral credibility 
whenever i t  has the opportunity to do so. Thus, the system ought not 
to deviate from empirical desert unless the benefits from that deviation 
are clear and substantial enough to outweigh the cost in undermining 
its moral credibility. 
Another claim of impracticability is of this sort: Each offender feels 
punishment differently, therefore it is impossible as a practical matter 
to construct a punishment system that gives each offender the 
punishment he deserves.  1 0 5  In other words, it would be impossible to 
construct a punishment "equivalency table, "  as discussed pre­
viously, 1 06 because the unique way in which each offender experiences 
punishment means that the "equivalency table" would have to be 
different for each offender. While this may be true with regard to 
deontological desert, which concerns itself with giving each offender 
the punishment that he personally deserves, the objection is inapplic­
able to empirical desert . Empirical desert concerns itself with giving 
not the punishment that each individual offender actually deserves but 
rather with the amount of punishment called for under the principles 
that track the community's intuitions of justice - it is the community's 
1 04 See. for example. J. S .  H all. " Note: Guided to  Injustice'): The Effect of Sentencing Guidelines on 
Indigent Defendants and Public Defense . .  ( 1 999)  36 Am.  Crim. L. Rev.  1 33 1  1 364-65 . 
1 0 5  Tonry. ··obsolescence and Immanence . . . note 74 above. at 1 164. Andrew von H irsch otTers a 
di fferent response to this kind of objection. He argues that, under deontological desert. the  
onerousness of punishment should ret1ect the  degree to which the  penalty intrudes on punished 
persons· rights, not  their  subjective preferences. The subjective-preference view holds only for 
deterrence theories. A .  von H i rsch, Censure and Sanctions ( Oxford 1 99 3 ), pp .  3 3-35. 
l or, See text accompanying note 55 .  
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perception of the criminal justice system's moral authority that counts, 
not the transcendent truth of the punishment the offender deserves .  
Empirical desert calls not for an equivalency table set according to the 
extent of each offender's reaction to each kind of punishment, but 
rather for an equivalency table set according to the community's 
collective judgment of the relative punitive bite among different 
punishment methods . 
IV .  SUMMARY:  A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THREE CONCEPTIONS 
OF DESERT 
In  the course of Part I I I  a good deal of detail has been added to the 
picture of the three conceptions of desert presented in Part I I .  It may 
be useful to pull these points together in a way that summarises the 
strength and weakness of each as a distributive principle for criminal 
l iability and punishment . 
Vengeful desert focuses upon the offense harm and, in  its strictest 
form, sets the deserved punishment to match this amount of harm, 
preferably imposed through the same or a related method as the 
offence conduct. In a less l iteral view, an exact equivalency of method 
and amount is  not necessary for deserved punishment; generally 
proportionality is enough . Typically, this will mean that serious 
offences will require prison, or  something more serious. The exact 
amount of punishment deserved is not clear; only a general range of 
punishment, proportionate to the harm caused, i s  necessary, and 
people tend to disagree about just how much punishment is enough in 
any given case, which tends to undercut the practicality of translating 
this conception of desert into a workable criminal justice system. Even 
if it were practical, such a conception of desert would produce 
common and significant deviations from what moral philosophers and 
the community would perceive to be just . Such a distribution therefore 
would suffer the crime control costs of such deviations, but without 
the crime-control benefits that might derive from the traditional 
utilitarian mechanisms for fighting crime, such as general deterrence, 
incapacitation of the dangerous, or rehabilitation as d istributive 
principles . 
Deontological desert and empirical desert differ from vengeful 
desert in a number of important ways . Their primary concern is setting 
punishment that puts the offender in his proper ordinal rank 
according to his moral blameworthiness, rather than a concern for 
the absolute amount of punishment imposed or for the exact severity 
of the punishment continuum endpoint. Once that endpoint is set, 
which all societies must do, the demands of deontological and 
empirical desert are quite specific. These conceptions of desert also 
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differ from vengeful desert in that their focus is almost exclusively on 
the amount of punishment, not the method by which i t  is imposed, 
thus, they have no preference for prison.  (These conceptions of desert 
can play a role in setting the general severity of punishment, in 
determining the punishment continuum endpoint , but only to suggest 
a range of punishment severity beyond which the endpoint should not 
be set .  In other words, " limiting retributivism" may well make sense in 
this context, even if  it is inappropriate as a distributive principle for 
punishment . )  
Deontological desert differs from empirical desert in  that the 
former offers a transcendent truth about justice, while the latter offers 
only the community's intuitions of j ustice . In that regard, deontolo­
gical desert would seem to provide an advantage over empirical desert 
because the latter suffers from the fact that people's intuitions of  
justice may be  unjust, in  a transcendent moral sense. I n  contrast, 
deontological desert suffers a number of difficulties as a distributive 
principle that empirical desert does not .  There is significant disagree­
ment among moral philosophers about the principles of j ustice, which 
makes it difficult use it as the basis for constructing a working criminal 
justice system. It  also may be criticised as failing to avoid avoidable 
crime. One might be tempted to use it nonetheless, perhaps in 
conjunction with empirical desert, to provide a transcendent check on 
the principles of justice derived from the community's shared 
intuitions of justice, but because of modern moral philosophy's heavy 
rel iance upon intuitions of justice, there is some question as to whether 
it can effectively perform even this role. 
Empirical desert distributes punishment according to the principles 
of justice derived from the community's shared intuitions . There is a 
good deal of agreement on these intuitions, at least regarding those 
core wrongs that make up the central part of criminal law, and it is 
practicable to construct a criminal j ustice system based upon this 
conception. Its primary focus is assuring that an offender receives the 
punishment that will place him at his appropriate ordinal rank 
according to his blameworthiness ( although empirical desert can also 
have some influence in a society's setting the endpoint of its 
punishment continuum, but in this role, i t  operates only by identifying 
extremes beyond which the endpoint should not be set) .  Empirical 
desert does not suffer the standard disutility objection leveled against 
deontological desert because it is designed to advance the interests of 
effective crime contro l :  by building system's  moral credibility with the 
community, i t  harnesses the enormous power of social influence . But it 
is subject to the valid criticism that it may produce results that, while 
they reflect the community's shared intuitions of justice, nonetheless 
may be unjust in the sense of a transcendent truth of j ustice . 
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CONCLUSION 
I t  has been argued here that the failure to appreciate the existence of 
three quite distinct conceptions of desert - vengeful, deontological , and 
empirical - commonly leads to confusion in the critique of desert as a 
principle for the distribution of criminal liability and punishment.  
Criticisms of desert are commonly offered without appreciating that a 
criticism may be valid with regard to one conception of desert but not 
another, thus leading writers to reject "desert" generally while in fact 
their criticisms only suggest rejecting one specific conception of desert . 
And where desert is adopted as a distributive principle, the failure to 
appreciate the different conceptions creates confusion in its applica­
tion. Arguments based on one conception of desert are used as the 
basis for an application based upon a different conception. It is not 
uncommon to see writers switch between different conceptions of 
desert during their analysis without acknowledging, or perhaps even 
realising, that they are doing so. 
Distinguishing the three modern conceptions of desert may clarify 
the te1ms of the debate, but it might not .  Consider this: In  speculating 
about the cause of the confusions reviewed in Part I I I ,  i t  may strike 
one as an odd coincidence that the modern scholars who make use of 
the vengeful conception of desert commonly are those who oppose 
it . 1 07 It is hard to know whether this is cause or effect. Do they oppose 
a desert distributive principle because they conceive of desert in the 
terms described here as vengeful desert? Or, do they treat "desert" in 
their writings as having the characteristics of vengeful desert because 
they oppose a desert distribution, and vengeful desert provides the 
ugliest straw man available to help them rally the opposition they 
seek? But even if some misunderstandings in the current debate are not 
accidental, an account of the important distinctions among modern 
conceptions of desert can at least make it more difficult to mislead . 
Whatever the cause of the confusion, it seems clear that the 
usefulness of the ongoing debate over desert as a distributive principle 
can only be enhanced by distinguishing these three conceptions of it .  
Given the recently increasing popularity of desert, clarification of the 
debate has not only academic but practical importance. 
107 See for example A.  J. Hosmanek. "Cutting the Cord:  Ho'oponopono and H awaiian Restorative 
Justice in the Criminal Law Context''  ( 2005) 5 Pepp. Disp.  Resol .  L .J .  359, 3 70; C. Slobogin, 
·'The Civilization of the Criminal Law"' (2005) 58 Vand.  L. Rev. 1 2 1 ,  147; R. Shafer-Landau, 
"The Failure of  Retributivism"' ( 1 996) 8 2  Phi l .  Studies 289. 299; Tonry, note 40 above: R ubin . 
note 40 above; Dolinko, note 42 above; Lacey, note 1 9  above; Dressler, note 78 above; Luna, 
note 78 above: M u rphy, note 83 above. 
